Inhalt

Lernziele

Die Studierenden werden in die theoretischen Grundlagen der Finanzintermediation eingeführt.

Vorlesungsunterlagen

Die Vorlesungsunterlagen sind im ILIAS-System verfügbar:

Literatur

Bolton, P./Scharfstein, D.S. (1990): A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting. In. American Economic Review, 80, S. 93-106.
Bolton, P./Scharfstein, D.S. (1996): Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors. In: Journal of Political Economy, 104, S. 1- 25.
Diamond, D.W. (1984): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. In: Review of Economic Studies, 51, S. 393-414.
Diamond, D.W./Dybvig, P.H. (1983): Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. In: Journal of Political Economy, 91, S. 401-419.
Diamond, D.W./Rajan, R.G. (2001): Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking. In: Journal of Political Economy, 109, S. 287-327.
Gale, D./Hellwig, M. (1985): Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem. In: Review of Economic Studies, 52, S 647-663.
Hart, O./Moore, J. (1994): A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, S. 841-879.
Holmström, B./Tirole, J. (1997): Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, S. 663-691.
Manove, M./Padilla, A.J./Pagano, M. (2001): Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks. In: The RAND Journal of Economics, 32, S. 726-744.
Petersen, M./Rajan, R.G. (1995): The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, S. 407-444.

Weiterführende Literatur

Hartmann-Wendels/Pfingsten/Weber (2010): Bankbetriebslehre, 5. Auflage, Springer Verlag.
Freixas/Rochet (1997): Microeconomics of Banking, MIT Press.